Yugoslavia 1993-94

Under Tito Yugoslavia ran a budget deficit that was financed by printing money. This led to rates of inflation of 15 to 25 percent per year. After Tito the Communist Party pursued progressively more irrational economic policies. These irrational policies and the breakup of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia now consists of only Serbia and Montenegro) led to heavier reliance upon printing or otherwise creating money to finance the operation of the government and the socialist economy. This created the worst hyperinflation in history up to this time.

By the early 1990s the government used up all of its own hard currency reserves and proceded to loot the hard currency savings of private citizens. It did this by imposing more and more difficult restrictions on private citizens access to their hard currency savings in government banks.

The government operated a network of stores at which goods were supposed to be available at artificially low prices. In practice these store seldom had anything to sell and goods were only available at free markets where the prices were far above the official prices that goods were supposed to sell at in government stores. In particular, all of the government gasoline stations eventually were closed and gasoline was available only from roadside dealers whose operation consisted of a parked car with a plastic can of gasoline sitting on the hood. The market price was the equivalent of $8 per gallon.

The combination of the shortage of gasoline and the government confiscation of German Deutsche mark deposits created a bizaar episode. A man after repeated attempts to get the government to let him withdraw his Deutsche mark deposits as Deutsche marks announced the was going to commit suicide in front of a government building by dousing himself with gasoline and igniting it. On the appointed day he showed up with a canister of gasoline. The media was there to film his protest. The police were also there and arrested the man. Afterwards the television station got numerous phone calls asking what had happened to the canister of gasoline.

Most car owners gave up driving and tried to rely upon public transportation. But the Belgrade transit authority (GSP) did not have the funds necessary for keeping its fleet of 1200 buses operating. Instead it ran fewer than 500 buses. These buses were overcrowded and the ticket collectors could not get aboard to collect fares. Thus GSP could not collect fares even though it was desperately short of funds.

Delivery trucks, ambulances, fire trucks and garbage trucks were also short of fuel. The government announced that gasoline would not be sold to farmers for fall harvests and planting.

Despite the government desperate printing of money it still did not have the funds to keep the infrastructure in operation. Pot holes developed in the streets, elevators stopped functioning, and construction projects were closed down. The unemployment rate exceeded 30 percent.

The government tried to counter the inflation by imposing price controls. But when inflation continued the government price controls made the price producers were getting ridiculous low they stopped producing. In October of 1993 the bakers stopped making bread and Belgrade was without bread for a week. The slaughter houses refused to sell meat to the state stores and this meant meat became unvailable for many sectors of the population. Other stores closed down for inventory rather than sell their goods at the government mandated prices. When farmers refused to sell to the government at the artificially low prices the government dictated, government irrationally used hard currency to buy food from foreign sources rather than remove the price controls. The Ministry of Agriculture also risked creating a famine by selling farmers only 30 percent of the fuel they needed for planting and harvesting.

Later the government tried to curb inflation by requiring stores to file paper work every time they raised a price. This meant that many of the stores employees had to devote their time to filling out these government forms. Instead of curbing inflation this policy actually increased inflation because the stores tended increase prices by a bigger jump so that they would not have file forms for another price increase so soon.

In October of 1993 the created a new currency unit. One new dinar was worth one million of the old dinars. In effect, the government simply removed six zeroes from the paper money. This of course did not stop the inflation and between October 1, 1993 and January 24, 1995 prices increased by 5 quadrillion percent. This number is a 5 with 15 zeroes after it.

In November of 1993 the government postponed turning on the heat in the state apartment buildings in which most of the population lived. The residents reacted to this withholding of heat by using electrical space heaters which were inefficient and overloaded the electrical system. The government power company then had to order blackouts to conserve electricity.

The social structure began to collapse. Thieves robbed hospitals and clinics of scarce pharmaceuticals and then sold them in front of the same places they robbed. The railway workers went on strike and closed down Yugoslavia's rail system.

In a large psychiatric hospital 87 patients died in November of 1994. The hospital had no heat, there was no food or medicine and the patients were wandering around naked.

The government set the level of pensions. The pensions were to be paid at the post office but the government did not give the post offices enough funds to pay these pensions. The pensioners lined up in long lines outside the post office. When the post office ran out of state funds to pay the pensions the employees would pay the next pensioner in line whatever money they received when someone came in to mail a letter or package. With inflation being what it was the value of the pension would decrease drastically if the pensioners went home and came back the next day. So they waited in line knowing that the value of their pension payment was decreasing with each minute they had to wait in line.

Many Yugoslavian businesses refused to take the Yugoslavian currency at all and the German Deutsche Mark effectively became the currency of Yugoslavia. But government organizations, government employees and pensioners still got paid in Yugoslavian dinars so there was still an active exchange in dinars. On November 12, 1993 the exchange rate was 1 DM = 1 million new dinars. By November 23 the exchange rate was 1 DM = 6.5 million new dinars and at the end of November it was 1 DM = 37 million new dinars. At the beginning of December the bus workers went on strike because their pay for two weeks was equivalent to only 4 DM when it cost a family of four 230 DM per month to live. By December 11th the exchange rate was 1 DM = 800 million and on December 15th it was 1 DM = 3.7 billion new dinars. The average daily rate of inflation was nearly 100 percent. When farmers selling in the free markets refused to sell food for Yugoslavian dinars the government closed down the free markets. On December 29 the exchange rate was 1 DM = 950 billion new dinars.

About this time there occurred a tragic incident. As usual pensioners were waiting in line. Someone passed by their line carrying bags of groceries from the free market. Two pensioners got so upset at their situation and the sight of someone else with groceries that they had heart attacks and died right there.

At the end of December the exchange rate was 1 DM = 3 trillion dinars and on January 4, 1994 it was 1 DM = 6 trillion dinars. On January 6th the government declared that the German Deutsche was an official currency of Yugoslavia. About this time the government announced a new new dinar which was equal to 1 billion of the old new dinars. This meant that the exchange rate was 1 DM = 6,000 new new dinars. By January 11 the exchange rate had reached a level of 1 DM = 80,000 new new dinars. On January 13th the rate was 1 DM = 700,000 new new dinars and six days later it was 1 DM = 10 million new new dinars.

The telephone bills for the government operated phone system were collected by the postmen. People postponed paying these bills as much as possible and inflation reduced there real value to next to nothing. One postman found that after trying to collect on 780 phone bills he got nothing so the next day he stayed home and paid all of the phone bills himself for the equivalent of a few American pennies.

Here is another illustration of the irrationality of the government's policies. James Lyon, a journalist, made twenty hours of international telephone calls from Belgrade in December of 1993. The bill for these calls was 1000 new new dinars and it arrived on January 11th. At the exchange rate for January 11th of 1 DM = 150,000 dinars it would have cost less than one German pfennig to pay the bill. But the bill was not due until January 17th and by that time the exchange rate reached 1 DM = 30 million dinars. Yet the free market value of those twenty hours of international telephone calls was about $5,000. So the government despite being strapped for hard currency gave James Lyon $5,000 worth of phone calls essentially for nothing.

It was against the law to refuse to accept personal checks. Some people wrote personal checks knowing that in the few days it took for the checks to clear inflation would wipe out as much as 90 percent of the cost of covering those checks.

On January 24, 1994 the government introduced the super dinar equal to 10 million of the new new dinars. The Yugoslav government's official position was that the hyperinflation occurred "because of the unjustly implemented sanctions against the Serbian people and state."

Source: James Lyon, "Yugoslavia's Hyperinflation, 1993-1994: A Social History," East European Politics and Societies vol. 10, no. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 293-327.


Inflation in the Roman Empire

The episodes of extreme inflation took a standard form. First the government started building up the army and undertaking public works projects. These projects increased expenditures drastically and the government raised tax rates. But the higher tax rates encouraged tax evasion and discouraged economic activity. The tax base diminished and soon the tax needs exceeded the tax capacity of the government. The government then resorted to debasing the coins of the realm. This took the form of replacing the gold and silver in coins with copper and other cheaper metals. Over the period 218 to 268 A.D. the silver content of Roman coins dropped to one five thousandth of its original level. Sometimes the size and weight of coins were reduced. It also meant vastly increasing the amount of coins in circulation. There was a corresponding increase in prices. The emperors usually blamed the price increases on the greed of merchants.

One famous episode occurred during the reign of the Emperor Diocletian in last part of the third century AD. Diocletian's predecessors had been issuing tin-plated copper coins for what had once been a silver coin. Diocletian tried to bring back some honesty to the coinage by issuing copper coins that were not purporting to be something they were not.

Diocletian ordered a vast increase in the armed forces to guard against further attacks by the barbarians. Taxes were increased to pay for defenses but much of the funds raised went to pay for public monuments as well as rebuilding his new capital of Nicomedia in western Anatolia. When he ran out of funds Diocletian resorted to the use of forced labor for his projects. But Diocletian had issued vast amounts of copper coins. This led to price increases. When prices rose Diocletian attributed the inflation to the greed of merchants. In 301 AD Diocletian issued an edict declaring fixed prices; i.e., price controls. His edict provided for the death penalty for anyone selling above the control prices. There was also penalties (less severe) for anyone paying more than the control price. Irate consumers sometimes destroyed the businesses of those who sold higher than the control prices.

In the short-run these draconian measures may have curbed inflation but in the long-run the results were disaster. Merchants stopped selling goods but this led to penalties against hoarding. People went out of business but Diocletian countered with laws saying that every man had to pursue the occupation of their father. The penalty for not doing so was death. This was justified on the basis that leaving the occupation of ones father was like a soldier deserting in time of war. The effect of this was to turn free men into serfs.


John Law and the Hyperinflation and Speculative Bubble in France c. 1719

The public and private extravagances of Louis XIV left France with a debt of 3 billion livres when the Regime of Louis XV came to power. Even with an excellent system of centralized administration and finance created by Colbert the new regime was finding it hard to meet the interest payments on the debt. John Law, a Scottish adventurer, was promoting policies which might help the Regime.

John Law was the son of a banker from Scotland. In London John Law was a gambler and playboy who killed a man in a duel. Law was arrested and convicted of murder but he escaped from prison and fled to the Continent. In Amsterdam he studied financial institutions and in 1705 he published a treatise entitled Money and Trade Considered in which he argued that the more money in circulation the greater the prosperity of a country. In his words,

Domestic trade depends upon money. A greater quantity employs more people than a lesser quantity. An addition to the money adds to the value of the country.
Law tried to interest the governments of several countries in his monetary schemes, but only the financially strapped regime of Louis XV gave him an opportunity to implement them. In 1716 Law was granted authority to create the Banque Generale with a capital of 6 million livres. Law raised only 25 percent of the capital in cash and covered the other 4.5 million livres with government debt (billets d'etat) which was worth only one fourth of its face value. So Law capitalization of the Banque Generale really only amounted to about 2.6 million livres.

Law's Banque Generale was authorized to issue interest-paying bank notes payable in silver on demand. It soon had 60 million livres in notes outstanding. The Regime required regional tax payments to be in the form of Banque Generale banknotes so there was a ready market for Law's banknotes. Because these banknotes paid interest and were convenient they sold at a premium over their face value.

The Regime also wanted to develop the territories of Louisiana in North America. Law was granted a charter for the Compagnie de la d'Occident and it was given a 25 year lease on the French holdings of Louisiana. In return the Compagnie was required to settle at least 6,000 French citizens and 3,000 slaves. The Compagnie was also granted a monopoly on the growing and sale of tobacco.

The Compagnie acquired the Compagnie de Senegal, which operated in West Africa, as a source of slaves. It then merged with the French East India Company and the French China Company to form Compagnie de Indes. This company had a virtual monopoly on French foreign trade.

Law's Banque Generale, under the new name of Banque Royale, was added to the combination which Law called his "System."

The Compagnie de Indes issued 200,000 shares at a price of 500 livres each. By 1718 the share price had fallen to 250 livres. In 1719 the Banque pumped up the supply of notes by 30 percent. It also acquired the right to act as the national tax collector for nine years. The Compagnie stock then doubled and redoubled in price.

Law then came with a plan to pay off the troublesome state debt. The Regime would issue notes paying 3 percent interest to its debtors. These debts could then be used to buy stock in Law's Compagnie de Indes. The Compagnie share price rose to 5,000 livres in August 1719 and 8,000 livres in October. People flooded into Paris to buy stock in Law's Compagnie. Speculation in Compagnie stock went wild. Stock was being purchased with only 10 percent downpayment. Fortunes were being made right and left. One beggar made 70 million livres.

John Law became an international celebrity. The Pope sent an envoy to the birthday party of Law's daughter. Law converted to Catholicism and was appointed Controlleur des Finances by the Regime.

Compagnie de Indes shares peaked at a price of 20,000 livres at the end of 1719. In January 1720 two royal princes decided to cash in their shares of the Compagnie. Others decided to follow their example. Law had to print 1.5 million livres in paper money. As Controlleur of Finances, John Law tried to stem the tide by making it illegal to hold more than 500 livres in gold or silver. He devalued banknotes relative to foreign currency to encourage exports and discourage imports. Nevertheless Compagnie de Indes stock fell from 9,000 livres to 5,000 livres. Law was denounced and stripped of his office of Controlleur. As head of the Compagnie de Indes and the Banque Royale he bought up stock and banknotes to try to raise their price, but by June 1720 he had to suspend payments.

John Law fled to Holland in 1720 and his properties in France were seized by the Regime. He lamented,

Last year I was the richest individual who ever lived, today I have nothing, not even enough to keep alive.

Hyperinflation in France After the Revolution

In the spring of 1789 the French Assemblee decreed the issuance of 400 million livres of notes, called assignats, secured by the properties which had been confiscated from the Church during the revolution. By the fall of 1789 the Assemblee approved the issuance of 800 million of noninterest-bearing notes and decreed that the limit on such notes was to be 1.2 billion livres. Despite this stated limit, nine months later another 600 million livres was approved and in September 1791 another 300 million. In April of 1791 another 300 million was approved.

Prices rose, but wages didn't keep up and in 1793 a mob plundered 200 stores in Paris. Price controls were imposed (Law of the Maximum). Output decreased and rationing had to be implemented. To force acceptance of its money the French government imposed a 20 year prison sentence on anyone selling its notes at a discount and dictated a death sentence for anyone differentiating between paper livres and gold or silver livres in setting prices.

By 1794 there were 7 billion livres (assignats) in circulation. In May 1795 this total reached 10 billion livres and by July 1795 it had gone up to 14 billion livres.

When the total reached 40 billion livres the printing plates for assignats were publically destroyed. A new type of note, called a mandat, was issued, but within two years these also lost 97 percent of their value. The printing plates for mandats were also publically destroyed. In 1797 both assignats and mandats were repudiated and a new monetary system based upon gold was instituted.


The Inflation in the Confederate States of America 1861-1865

From October of 1861 to March of 1864 the commodity price index rose an average rate of 10 percent per month. When the Civil War ended in April 1865 the cost of living in the South was 92 times what it was before the war started. This inflation was obviously caused by the expansion of the money supply. The role of the money supply in establishing the price level is confirmed even more strongly by the results of an attempt to curb the growth of the money supply in 1864.

In February the Confederate Congress decreed a currency reform. All bills greater than five dollars were to be converted into bonds paying 4 percent interest. All bills not converted by April 1 would be exchanged for a new issue at a ratio of 2 for 3. Prior to the reform people spent wildly and drove prices up 23 percent in one month. But, by May 1864, the reform had been completed and the stock of money was reduced by one third. The general price index declined. Eugene Lerner, an economist who studied this inflation, commented on this result:

This price decline took place in spite of invading Union armies, the impending military defeat, the reduction of foreign trade, the disorganized government, and the low morale of the Confederate army. Reducing the stocks of money had a more significant effect on prices than these powerful forces.
The increase in the money supply came as a result of the Confederacy inability to collect funds through taxes. Only 5 percent of its expenditures were covered by taxes. Initially the Confederate government tried to borrow extensively. This failed because the planters had funds only after the fall harvest, but the war started in April. The war interferred with the harvest and export of the cotton crop so the planters were asking the government for help instead of loaning it funds. Consequently less than 30 percent of the funds for the Confederacy came from bonds. Thus, the Confederate government saw printing money as an unavoidable method for financing the war. The Confederate Congress was reluctant to use this measure and stated in the act which authorized the printing of money that it was "not to exceed at any one time one million of dollars." Actually 1500 times this amount was printed.

The printing of such large sums created a major problem. Paper, engravers and printers were hard to find. In desperation, the Secretary of the Treasury recommended that counterfeit money be utilized. Anyone holding a counterfeit bill was supposed to exchange it for a government bond and the government would stamp it "valid" and spend it.

When the Union army captured sections of the Confederacy people took or sent their Confederate money to the areas where it still could be used. Thus the effect of the capture of Confederate territory was like an increase in the money stock in the remaining Confederate territory. The disruptions of the war also decreased production so it was a matter of more and more money chasing fewer and fewer goods.


The German Hyperinflation of the Early 1920's

Some say the German hyperinflation started when Germany entered World War I in 1914. At that time Germany opted to finance the war by borrowing rather than increasing taxes. The German policy makers chose borrowing because they expected to win the war and intended to force the losers to pay for the cost of the war. It was thus logical to the policy makers to use borrowing rather than taxation.

But Germany lost the war and the victors imposed heavy reparation payments upon her. The reparation payments were perceived as unfair in Germany and the social democratic government was reluctant to impose the burden of their payment upon the German population. In retaliation for the nonpayment France and the other allies occupied the industrial area of the Ruhr on the western border of Germany. Germany was forced to buy more using foreign currencies, while at the same time the occupation of the Ruhr area made it impossible to collect tariff on imported goods. The government, strapped for funds, resorted to printing money. The value of the mark relative to other currencies fell thereby increasing the cost of imported goods. Prices rose increasing the cost of running the government. This necessitated the printing of even more money. Prices rose further and the exchange rates for the mark dropped even more. The result was hyperinflation.

At first, Germans reacted to the higher prices by economizing and reducing their consumption. But when they realized that it was not just a matter of some things being more expensive but instead that the mark was losing value they reacted by spending their marks as fast as possible. This meant that there was little constraint on prices.

There were winners as well as losers in this hyperinflation. Those on fixed incomes and who were owed a specific amount of money found that the real value of their holdings reduced to zero. But those who owed money found their debt effectively wiped out.


Inflation in China 1939-1950

A state bank for China, called the Hu-pu (Board of Revenue) Bank, was established in 1905. By 1907 two other government banks, the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications, were established and authorized to issue bank notes. The imperial government and all subsequent governments looked upon these banks as vehicles for creating money for the government to use to cover its deficits or for any other reason. There were severe penalties imposed for anyone discounting provincial government banknotes.

Despite attempts on the part of governments to abuse their control of the banking system, the banks were able to resist these attempts until the 1930's and the war with Japan.

by Thomas Graham

IF YOU are a first-home buyer who does not like the idea of spending $500,000 for an undistinguished, two-bedroom house in a middle-ring suburb of Sydney, perhaps you should look further afield.

While Sydney real estate prices have dropped, they have not been ravaged by the economic crisis as they have in many European countries. And the price crash is attracting overseas investors.

The managing director of Marsh and Parsons real estate agency in London, Peter Rollings, said prices had fallen massively. "[They] are down between 20-35 per cent since August 2007 and, on top of that, sterling also weakened dramatically … last year. As a result, we saw large numbers of overseas buyers coming to London buying blue-chip property at knock-down prices."

France seemed to have escaped the real estate woes of Britain, but its luck has run out, with house prices tumbling.

Charles Gillooley, a director of an agency in the Dordogne region in south-western France, said the crash meant good deals for foreign investors.

"The reality of the economic crisis is sinking in to most French vendors, who have adjusted their prices downwards.

"One of our houses with beautiful views, a swimming pool and a large garden was on the market for €278,000 [$490,000] and has been reduced for €214,000 [$377,000]. That's a huge drop."

In recent years, French real estate in areas such as the Dordogne and the south has relied on the British buying second homes. But with economic uncertainty, prices have been reduced to attract buyers.

For the extravagant type wanting to buy big, there are properties such as the 176-bedroom Chateau de Nainville-les-Roches, 45 kilometres south of Paris. The 19th-century chateau on 40 hectares was sold for $6.1 million last November. Real estate agents in the area said that before the crash it could have fetched $20 million.

If France isn't your thing, then you may want to look at the olive groves of Italy. Calabria, in the south, offers cheaper property than in the more popular areas of Tuscany and Umbria, and a seaside villa can be bought for a fraction of the price of a similar property in the south of France. But if Europe doesn't appeal, there could soon be more property bargains closer to home.

Professor Steve Keen of the University of Western Sydney said he expected the Australian housing market to crash spectacularly. "We are going to see huge levels of unemployment, people will be forced to sell their houses and this will bring prices crashing down.

"I'm expecting a depression out of this economic crisis and house prices will simply not hold up when a depression is occurring."

By John Browne

This week, based on indicators of improving Chinese manufacturing activity, commodity and stock markets surged in the Pacific Rim. It appears that China's recession-fighting policies are being judged successful. The 41% rally in Chinese stocks in 2009 from the 2008 lows dwarfs the single-digit rallies in the US and Europe. With Western economies still sluggish, eyes are turning eastward for solutions to the global economic riddle. As such, recent hints at the direction of Chinese monetary policy should be closely regarded.

At the recent Group of 20 London meetings, China called for a new international monetary order with a gold link. This was followed by the sudden disclosure that China had used part of its huge gold output to boost its own reserves by some 600 metric tons, a 75% increase in total holdings since 2003. In his first 100

days in office, President Barack Obama's administration has injected nearly US$40 billion each day into US economy. Given the inflationary impact that such a torrent of new cash will spark, it is logical that the Chinese hedge its $1 trillion position with a more reliable store of value.

International money continues to flood towards the Chinese economic sphere, leaving the "old" industrial economies of America and Europe out in the cold. The cause is quite simple: the economies of America and China are mirror images of each other. The China-centric countries are producer-dominated and America is consumer-dominated. Over time, this dichotomy is producing massive shifts in global wealth.

For a century, American administrations have relied on the inflationary powers of paper money to finance consumer growth. The fact that the US dollar is the world's reserve currency enabled this scheme to persist for longer than would have been tolerated otherwise. The "stimulus and bailout agenda of George W Bush and Obama is the same practice on overdrive. While driving the country further into debt, it also ensures that it will be progressively less competitive in the global economy.

China, on the other hand, is the world's largest producer and one of the top three exporters, piling up vast current account surpluses, especially in US dollars. In order not to boost its currency to levels that would make its exports less competitive, China maintained its US dollar surpluses in dollars, investing the bulk, almost $1 trillion, of them in US Treasuries. This acted as "vendor financing" for its exports to America. The technique is similar to television commercials that promise "make no payments for four years", except in this case the deal is pushing 40 years.

To combat the global recession, China spent some $700 billion on a stimulus package, primarily focused on infrastructure. As such spending adds more value to the economy than government make-work programs, it now appears that China's stimulus package is having positive results.

Increased economic activity in China will benefit American companies with China-sourced sales. But the majority of the American economy remains oriented toward the American consumer, and his ever-increasing ability to take on debt. This is obviously not sustainable.

The outlook for America is for hyper-stagflation, or continued economic recession accompanied by rapidly rising prices. This calls into question the continued role of the US dollar as the world's reserve. Surplus nations, particularly China, are voicing their growing concern. They are exploring other, less volatile arrangements. They may be considering a return to the bulwark of monetary stability: gold.

Now the world's largest gold producer, China would benefit tremendously from a shift away from the US dollar and toward gold. She is clearly interested in world leadership, but would never dream of challenging the US militarily. However, in the 21st century, the weight of economics renders martial might largely irrelevant. Still, she can't afford to act irresponsibly.

There are a few considerations that should temper her ambitions. Even with the 600 metric ton increase over the past five years, China's gold holdings amount to only 1.6% of its total monetary reserves. Also, at 1,050 metric tons total, China's holdings are still dwarfed by the 8,132 metric tons held by the US.

Nevertheless, the Chinese call for a new, gold-linked reserve currency, combined with the near doubling of their own gold reserves, points to a major strategic trend that can be expected to spread to other surplus nations. The biggest winners, personal or governmental, will trade their dollars for gold before there's a rush for the door.

Private investors can ride the wave created by China's strategic shift by continuing to add to their gold positions.

The New York Fed is the most powerful financial institution you've never heard of. Look who's running it.

By Eliot Spitzer former New York Governor

The kerfuffle about current New York Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Stephen Friedman's purchase of some Goldman stock while the Fed was involved in reviewing major decisions about Goldman's future—well-covered by the Wall Street Journal here and here—raises a fundamental question about Wall Street's corruption. Just as the millions in AIG bonuses obscured the much more significant issue of the $70 billion-plus in conduit payments authorized by the N.Y. Fed to AIG's counterparties, the small issue of Friedman's stock purchase raises very serious issues about the competence and composition of the Federal Reserve of New York, which is the most powerful financial institution most Americans know nothing about.

A quasi-independent, public-private body, the New York Fed is the first among equals of the 12 regional Fed branches. Unlike the Washington Federal Reserve Board of Governors, or the other regional fed branches, the N.Y. Fed is active in the markets virtually every day, changing the critical interest rates that determine the liquidity of the markets and the profitability of banks. And, like the other regional branches, it has boundless power to examine, at will, the books of virtually any banking institution and require that wide-ranging actions be taken—from raising capital to stopping lending—to ensure the stability and soundness of the bank. Over the past year, the New York Fed has been responsible for committing trillions of dollars of taxpayer money to resuscitate the coffers of the banks it oversees.

Given the power of the N.Y. Fed, it is time to ask some very hard questions about its recent performance. The first question to ask is: Who is the New York Fed? Who exactly has been running the show? Yes, we all know that Tim Geithner was the president and CEO of the N.Y. Fed from 2003 until his ascension as treasury secretary. But who chose him for that position, and to whom did he report? The N.Y. Fed president reports to, and is chosen by, the Fed board of directors.

So who selected Geithner back in 2003? Well, the Fed board created a select committee to pick the CEO. This committee included none other than Hank Greenberg, then the chairman of AIG; John Whitehead, a former chairman of Goldman Sachs; Walter Shipley, a former chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, now JPMorgan Chase; and Pete Peterson, a former chairman of Lehman Bros. It was not a group of typical depositors worried about the security of their savings accounts but rather one whose interest was in preserving a capital structure and way of doing business that cried out for—but did not receive—harsh examination from the N.Y. Fed.

The composition of the New York Fed's board, which supervises the organization and current Chairman Friedman, is equally troubling. The board consists of nine individuals, three chosen by the N.Y. Fed member banks as their own representatives, three chosen by the member banks to represent the public, and three chosen by the national Fed Board of Governors to represent the public. In theory this sounds great: Six board members are "public" representatives.

So whom have the banks chosen to be the public representatives on the board during the past decade, as the crisis developed and unfolded? Dick Fuld, the former chairman of Lehman; Jeff Immelt, the chairman of GE; Gene McGrath, the chairman of Con Edison; Ronay Menschel, the chairwoman of Phipps Houses and also, not insignificantly, the wife of Richard Menschel, a former senior partner at Goldman. Whom did the Board of Governors choose as its public representatives? Steve Friedman, the former chairman of Goldman; Pete Peterson; Jerry Speyer, CEO of real estate giant Tishman Speyer; and Jerry Levin, the former chairman of Time Warner. These were the people who were supposedly representing our interests!

Of course, there have been the occasional nonfinance representatives from academia and labor. But they have been so outnumbered that their presence has done little to alter the direction of the board.

So is it any wonder that the N.Y. Fed has been complicit in the single greatest bailout of poorly managed banks in history? Any wonder that it has given—with virtually no strings attached—practically the entire contents of the Treasury to the very banks whose inability to manage risk has brought our economy to its knees? Any wonder that not a single CEO or senior executive of a major bank has been removed as a condition of hundreds of billions of direct cash and guarantees? Any wonder that, despite its fundamental responsibility to preserve the integrity of the banking system, it sat quietly on the sidelines as the leverage beneath the banks exploded and the capital underlying their investments shrank?

I do not mean to suggest that any of these board members intentionally discharged their duties with the specific goal of benefitting themselves. Rather, what we have seen is disastrous groupthink, a way of looking at the world from the perspective of Wall Street and Wall Street alone. That failure has brought the world economy to the edge of unraveling. And some of Geithner's early missteps betrayed an inability to get beyond this tunnel vision, such as the idea that the banks need to be first in line to be paid and to be paid in full. We can only hope that Geithner, who, to his credit, did try to raise some of the regulatory issues that mattered while he was at the Fed, is no longer in the mental prison of Lower Manhattan and will have more success now that he has a board of one—President Obama.

Perhaps it is time to calculate what these board members have been paid by their banks in salary and bonuses over the years and seek to have them return it to the public as small compensation for their failed oversight of the N.Y. Fed. And more fundamentally, perhaps it is time to take a hard look at the governing structure and supposed independence of this institution that actually controls the use of our tax dollars and, heaven help us, the fate of our economy.

Eliot Spitzer is the former governor of the state of New York

As the integrity of the US banking system is compromised, private citizens should consider becoming their own central banks. The days of irredeemable paper fiat currencies may be approaching its end, and there is a reason why the central banks hold gold - it is their default insurance.

Do not be fooled, the gold reserves of central banks are their actual Money. Debt-based paper dollars, yen, pounds are all just ridiculous currencies, sad shadowy mirrors of their former selves, which is gold and silver coin. Gold's manipulated volatility cannot mask its >16% annualized returns versus the USD over the past 8 years. Remember - in actuality, it is the depreciation of the world's fiat currencies we are seeing, not the appreciation of gold itself which is itself both money and a currency.

by James Turk

This week Bill Murphy and Chris Powell, co-founders of the Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee (www.gata.org), will be in London, England. Their trip is part of GATA’s ongoing effort to raise awareness of the gold cartel and its surreptitious intervention in the gold market.

Bill and Chris will meet with the British media to explain GATA’s findings. They will also attend an important fund raising event being held in support of GATA’s work. Their trip is another important step by GATA aimed at creating a free market in gold, one which is unfettered by government intervention.

Governments want a low gold price to make national currencies look good. Gold is recognizable the world over as the ‘canary in the coalmine’ when it comes to money. A rising gold price blurts the unpleasant truth that a national currency is being poorly managed and that its purchasing power is being inflated.

This reality is made clear by former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker. Commenting in his memoirs about the soaring gold price in the years immediately following the end of the gold standard in 1971, he notes: “Joint intervention in gold sales to prevent a steep rise in the price of gold, however, was not undertaken. That was a mistake.” It was a mistake because a rising gold price undermines the thin reed upon which all fiat currency rests – confidence. But it was a mistake only from the perspective of a central banker, which is of course at odds with anyone who believes in free markets.

The US government has learned from experience and taken Volcker’s advice. Given the US dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency, the US government has the most to lose if the market chooses gold over fiat currency and erodes the government’s stranglehold on the monopolistic privilege that it has awarded to itself of creating ‘money’.

So the US government intervenes in the gold market to make the dollar look worthy of being the world’s reserve currency when of course it is not equal to the demands of that esteemed role. The US government does this by trying to keep the gold price low, but this aim is an impossible task. In the end, gold always wins, i.e., its price inevitably climbs higher as fiat currency is debased, which is a reality understood and recognized by government policymakers. So recognizing the futility of capping the gold price, they instead compromise by letting the gold price rise somewhat, say, 15% per annum. In fact, against the dollar, gold is actually up 16.3% p.a. on average for the last eight years. In battlefield terms, the US government is conducting a managed retreat for fiat currency in an attempt to control gold’s advance.

Though it has let the gold price rise, gold has risen by less than it would in a free market because the purchasing power of the dollar continues to be inflated and also because gold remains so undervalued notwithstanding its annual appreciation this decade. These gains started from gold’s historic low valuation in 1999. Gold may not be as good a value as it was in 1999, but it nevertheless remains extremely undervalued.

For example, until the end of the 19th century, approximately 40% of the world’s money supply consisted of gold, and the remaining 60% was national currency. As governments began to usurp the money issuing privilege and intentionally diminish gold’s role, fiat currency’s role expanded by the mid-20th century to approximately 90%. The inflationary policies of the 1960s, particularly in the US, further eroded gold’s role to 2% by the time the last remnants of the gold standard were abandoned in 1971. Gold’s importance rebounded in the 1970s, which caused Volcker to lament the so-called mistakes of policymakers. Its percentage rose to nearly 10% by 1980. But gold’s percent of the world money supply thereafter declined, reaching about 1% in 1999. Today it still remains below 2%.

From this analysis it is reasonable to conclude that gold should comprise at least 10% of the world’s money supply. Because it is nowhere near that level, gold is undervalued.

So given the ongoing dollar debasement being pursued by US policymakers, keeping gold from exploding upward to a true free-market price is the first thing they gain from their interventions in the gold market. The other thing they gain is time. The time they gain enables them to keep their fiat scheme afloat so they can benefit from it, delaying until some future administration the scheme's inevitable collapse.

So how does the US government manage the gold price? They recruit Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase and Deutsche Bank to do it, by executing trades to pursue the US government’s aims. These banks are the gold cartel. I don't believe that there are any other members of the cartel, with the possible exception of Citibank as a junior member. The cartel acts with the implicit backing of the US government to absorb all losses that may be taken by the cartel members as they manage the gold price and further, to provide whatever physical metal is required to execute the cartel's trading strategy. How did the gold cartel come about?

There was an abrupt change in government policy circa 1990. It was introduced by then Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan in order to bail out the banks back then, which like now were insolvent. Taxpayers were already on the hook for hundreds of billions to bail out the collapsed ‘savings & loan’ industry, so adding to this tax burden was untenable. He therefore came up with an alternative.

Greenspan saw the free market as a golden goose with essentially unlimited deep pockets, and more to the point, that these pockets could be picked by the US government using its tremendous weight, namely, its financial resources for timed interventions in the free market combined with its propaganda power by using the media. In short, it was easier to bail out the insolvent banks back then by gouging ill-gained profits from the free markets instead of raising taxes.

Banks generated these profits by the Federal Reserve’s steepening of the yield curve, which kept long-term interest rates relatively high while lowering short-term rates. To earn this wide spread, banks leveraged themselves to borrow short-term and use the proceeds to buy long-term paper. This mismatch of assets and liabilities became known as the carry-trade.

The Japanese yen was a particular favorite to borrow. The Japanese stock market had crashed in 1990, and the Bank of Japan was pursuing a zero interest rate policy to try reviving the Japanese economy. A US bank could borrow Japanese yen for 0.2% and buy US T-notes yielding more than 8%, pocketing the spread, which did wonders for bank profits and rebuilding their capital base.

Gold also became a favorite vehicle to borrow because of its low interest rate. This gold came from central bank coffers, but they refused to disclose how much gold they were lending, making the gold market opaque and ripe for intervention by central bankers making decisions behind closed doors. The amount lent by central banks has been reliably estimated in various analyses published by GATA to be 12,000 to 15,000 tonnes, nearly one-half of central banks total holdings and 4-to-6 times annual new mine production of 2500 tonnes. The banks clearly jumped feet first into the gold carry-trade.

The carry-trade was a gift to the banks from the Federal Reserve, and all was well provided the yen and gold did not rise against the dollar because this mismatch of dollar assets and yen or gold liabilities was not hedged. Alas, both gold and the yen began to strengthen, which if allowed to rise high enough would force marked-to-market losses on those carry-trade positions in the banks. It was a major problem because the losses of the banks could be considerable, given the magnitude of the carry-trade.

So the gold cartel was created to manage the gold price, and all went well at first, given the help it received from the Bank of England in 1999 to sell one-half of its gold holdings. Gold was driven to historic lows, as noted above, but this low gold price created its own problem. Gold became so unbelievably cheap that value hunters around the world recognized the exceptional opportunity it offered, and demand for physical gold began to climb. As demand rose, another more intractable and unforeseen problem arose for the gold cartel.

The gold borrowed from the central banks had been melted down and turned into coins, small bars and monetary jewelry that were acquired by countless individuals around the world. This gold was now in ‘strong hands’, and these gold owners would only part with it at a much higher price. Therefore, where would the gold come from to repay the central banks?

While yen is a fiat currency and can be created out of thin air by the Bank of Japan, gold in contrast is a tangible asset. How could the banks repay all the gold they borrowed without causing the gold price to soar, further worsening the marked-to-market losses on their remaining positions?

In short, the banks were in a predicament. The Federal Reserve’s policies were debasing the dollar, and the ‘canary in the coalmine’ was warning of the loss of purchasing power. So Greenspan's policy of using interventions in the market to bail-out banks morphed yet again.

The gold borrowed from central banks would not be repaid because obtaining the physical gold to repay these loans would cause the gold price to soar. So beginning this decade, the gold cartel would conduct the government’s managed retreat, allowing the gold price to move generally higher in the hope that, basically, people wouldn’t notice. Given its ‘canary in a coalmine’ function, a rising gold price creates demand for gold, and a rapidly rising gold price would worsen the marked-to-market losses of the gold cartel.

So the objective is to allow the gold price to rise around 15% p.a., while at the same time enable the cartel members to intervene in the gold market with implicit government backing in order to earn profits to offset the growing losses on its gold liabilities. Its trading strategy to accomplish this task is clear. The gold cartel reverse engineers the black-box trend-following trading models.

Just look at the losses taken by some of the major commodity trading managers on their gold trading over the last decade. It is hundreds of millions of dollars of client money lost, and gained for the gold cartel to help offset their losses from the gold carry-trade. All to make the dollar look good by keeping the gold price lower than it should be and would be if it were allowed to trade in a market unfettered by government intervention.

There are only two outcomes as I see it. Either the gold cartel will fail in the end, or the US government will have destroyed what remains of the free market in America. I hope it is the former, but the continuing flow of events from Washington, D.C. and the actions of policymakers suggest it could be the latter.